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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITt CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
l./S • 
BILL JUE PARKER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15460 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
i~ppellant was convicted of being in actual 
physical control cf a motor vehicle while under the 
inflJence ~f i11tox1cating liquor contrary to the 
~ro~isionE ct Section 14-15-1 of the Revised 
,:;,_di1ca;ice; o:!:: Ogden City, 1964 Revision. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On April 26, 1977, Appellant was convicted 
L1 ·>.rden City Court and sentenced to 180 days in jail. 
)n A·.90~t IS, 1977, Defendant was convicted in Second 
'! "" "· ic 1· ::::ourt anci sentenced to 180 days in jail. 
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Respo 1c) c,~ ~ r_ ~_: J. .L '.~. 
.hE 
conviction. 
11:; 
On April 2, 19~1. a~ c.~0~oxima~ely 12:16 P.M., 
Robert Carpenter, an Ogden rf ty 0ol_ce Offic2r, was 
the corporate l::_,r, _1- ·o -~POl!S2 to a 
complaint that so;·reone ha~-, kn ·i(2c, 3. ct .:-2et sign do':m 
and was trying L~ 12ave ~ .).-'.) T.lpcn his 
arrival, Officer Ca1penter obs2rved a mo~or vehicle, the 
front portion of which was lying on top of the street 
sign stub; the rec.r ro): ':ion 3tuck in mud '"P to the hubs 
of the rear whee!.s 'I' 2:'-) l\:c: 11e appr0a~".12d, i·1e observed 
the rear wheels s;:n- • r,q 
quite badlv" (T.251 
Appellant in the 1clver 
his hands upon the st 
engine being "re-;-.r·cd 
shifting the vehicle s ecr 
in an effort to r~c 
street sign stub (T 27,]0: 
·rawn . 
j e with 
:'Hd the 
11e Appellant 
r_o "reverse" 
·> on the 
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Officer Carpenter observed a passenger in 
the right front seat and another in the rear seat, but 
testified that only the Appellant could have been 
operating the accelerator pedal causing the "racing" 
or "revving" of the vehicle's engine (T.24,29,30). 
The officer's observations were made standing 
immediately adjacent to the left front (dr~ver's) 
door of the vehicle, while looking directly at the 
Appellant and speaking with him (T.24,25). The police 
officer noted that vehicle tracks in the fresh snow 
led from the roadway to the vehicle's resting point 
and that the damage to the sign was consistent with 
the damage to the car (T.23). 
The police officer testified that the car, 
because of the sign stub and mud, could not have been 
moved (T23,24,28,29). 
As Appellant responded to Officer Carpenter's 
request that he turn off the engine and exit the vehicle, 
Officer Carpenter observed an open bottle of liquor 
leaning against Appellant's side, which tipped over 
and spilled on the front seat (T.27). Once out of 
the car, Appellant lost his balance and had to grab the 
car door to stand up (T.26). The officer had to "walk" 
-3-
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him to the police vehicle, because " ... he (Appellant) 
was unable to walk by himselfa. Each time Appellant 
tried to walk alone he lost his balance (T.26). The 
Appellant was belligerent with the police officer, 
calling him names (T.26). The police officer testified 
that without any question Appellant was intoxicated (T.26). 
Appellant testified that he had had several drinks (T.35) 
and that he " ... might have been" under the influence 
of intoxicants (T.33). 
ARGUEMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
INTOXICATING LIQUOR. 
While Appellant only addresses the issue of 
"actual physical control of the vehicle", and in his brief 
does not contradict the lower court's finding that 
Appellant was "under the influence of dmtoxicating 
liquor", Appellant does not admit thac he was, in fact, 
"under the influence of intoxicating liquor". 
The facts which collectively, but easily, lead 
to the conclusion that Appellant was "under the influence" 
are: (1) his loss of balance upon exiting the vehicle; 
(2) his inability to stand unassisted; (3) his inability 
-4-
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to walk; (4) his belligerence with officer; (4) his open 
bottle of liquor leaning against his side; (5) 
Appellant's testimony that he had had several drinks and 
"might have been" under the influence of intoxicants; 
and (6) the officer's opinion that Appellant was drunk. 
The finder-of-fact, Judge Calvin Gould (and 
earlier Judge David Roth) , found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Appellant was under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor. 
On appeal, the evidence should be viewed in 
the light most favorable to this verdict of conviction. 
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959); 
State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960). 
The finder-of-fact, in this case the district court judge, 
was in the best position to observe the facial expressions, 
mannerisms and tone of voice of witnesses and thus was 
in the best position to weigh the evidence. Such 
judgments are difficult, if not impossible to make on 
appeal. By examining the evidence, however, it is 
obvious that the judge's verdict is heavily supported 
by the evidence. The verdict will not be overturned 
appeal unless it appears that the evidence was so 
-5-
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inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds 
must have entered reasonable doubts that the crime was 
committed. State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 
212 (1957); State v. Danks, 19 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 
146 (1960). In other words, the strong presumption is 
that the trial verdict is correct. Appellant, to prevail, 
has the burden to prove that the verdict was unreasonable, 
and this he has not attempted whatsoever. 
POINT II 
DESPITE RELATIVE IMMOBILITY OF APPELLANT'S 
MOTOR VEHICLE, APPELLANT WAS NEVERTHELESS IN ACTUAL 
PHYSICAL CONTROL OF HIS MOTOR VEHICLE. 
The facts of this case differ substantially 
from those of the single Utah case, which discusses the 
concept of "actual physical control". In the Bugger 
case, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442, the defendant was 
found asleep, his car off the main-traveled portion of 
the roadway, and the engine was not running. The court 
specifically distinguished this from cases where the 
engine of the vehicle was operating or the driver was 
attempting to steer a moving vehicle. Bugger, supra at 
443. 
-6-
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Assuming, arguendo, that the police officer 
was correct in his conclusion that Appellant's car could 
not be moved, was Appellant in actual physical control 
through his actions of shifting gears, accelerating 
the engine, and holding the steering wheel in an attempt 
to "rock" the car loose? The Bugger case, supra, at 
443, seems to require that Appellant control the vehicle 
or exercise dominion over it. Respondent maintains that 
Appellant's actions (hands on wheel, gear shifting, and 
engine acceleration) do constitute control over the 
vehicle or an exercise of dominion. To buttress this 
assertion Respondent now refers to other state appellate 
decisions where the precise issue of actual physical control 
over immobile vehicles has been decided. 
In Gallagher v. Virginia, 205 Va.666, 139 
S.E.2d 37 at 38, testimony showed that the defendant was 
in the driver's seat of the car and accelerating the 
motor. The car had no traction and it would have been 
impossible for the car to have moved by itself. The 
officer stated that when he arrived the wheel was touching 
the ground, but only with slight traction and it was spinning. 
The court, in upholding defendant's conviction for operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants, 
-7-
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held that manipulating the mechanical or electrical 
devices of the vehicle constituted operation of the 
vehicle despite the clear immobility of the vehicle. 
The court made favorable reference to Flournoy v. Georgia, 
106 6a.App. 756, 128 S.E.2d 528; Iowa v. Webb, 202 Iowa 
633, 210 N.W. 751; Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 Mass. 22, 
160 N.E. 305, Delaware v. Pritchett, 3 Storey 583, 53 Del. 
583, 173 A.2d 886; New Jersey v. Ray 4 N.J. Misc. 493, 
133 A. 486; New York v. Domagala, 123 Misc. 757, 206 NYS 
288; Conneticut v. Swift, 125 Conn. 399, 6A.2d 359; and 
State v. Sweeney, 77 N.J. Super. 512, 187 A.2d 39. 
In Arizona v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 p.2d 338 
(1954), the defendant was charged with being in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence. 
The Arizona Court, echoing Justice Ellett's opinion in 
the Bugger case, supra, at 443, stated: 
The conclusion we draw therefrom 
is that the legislature intended 
the present law (adding the phrase 
"being in actual physical control" 
to the existing "driving" provision) 
to embrace fact situations not 
covered by the old, more particularly 
the legislature intended the law 
should apply to persons having con~r?l 
of a vehicle while not actuall drivin 
it or aving it in motion. ~· supra, 
at 339. (Emphasis supplied.) 
-8-
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In State v. Overbay, 206 N.W. 634, defendant 
drunkenly slides his car into a ditch. The Sheriff found 
the defendant "at the wheel operating the engine, and 
defendant and friend behind the car pushing the same; 
in a joint effort to get the car out of the ditch." 
The court observed, "For the purpose of a conviction, 
it must be said that the operation of the engine in the 
attempt to get the car back on the road was a violation 
of the statute, even though it be true that he had not 
operated the car prior to the accident." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
In People v. Domagala, 123 Misc. 757, 206 
NYS 288, the defendant was also attempting the impossible. 
He had tried six times to drive up over a curb, but because 
the front wheels were squarely against the curb, and the 
car lacked sufficient power, the effort was futile; each 
attempt resulted in a stalled engine. The court expressly 
rejected the notion that the law was not violated until 
the car moved; and held that the defendant "began to 
violate the law the instant he began to manipulate the 
machinery of the motor for the purpose of putting the 
automobile into motion." 
-9-
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In State v. Storrs, 163 A. 560, the Supreme 
Court of Vermont, the vehicle's motor could not be started, 
although the "self-starter" was operational. The court 
held that "the turning of the ignition switch and the 
effect of this upon the self-starter was an operation of 
the car . " 
In Carter v. Texas, 353 S.W.2d 458, the court 
found that evidence that defendant was seated behind 
the steering wheel attempting to drive it from the 
flooded ditch and that tire and skid marks led from 
the broken barricade on the highway to the automobile, 
was suff icent to show that defendant drove the auto-
mobile as alleged upon a public highway while intoxicated. 
In Roberts v. Maine, 29 A2d 457, the Court 
addressed this issue: 
Is one who sits behind the 
steering wheel of an automobile 
with the motor running and the car 
in gear and the rear wheels 
spinning and swerving slightly 
from side to side, while the front 
end of the motor vehicle is 
suspended in the air five or six 
inches so that the turning of 
the steering wheel cannot 
control the direction or 
course of the motor vehicle 
and the front end of the 
motor vehicle chained to the 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rear of a truck ahead being 
towed by the vehicle ahead 
guilty of operating a moto; 
vehicle under this statute? 
The court answered affirmatively by endorsing 
the disputed instruction to the jury: 
. . . if you believe that 
(the defendant) was behind 
the wheel and put the motor 
in motion, had placed the car 
in gear, that the rear wheels, 
because of the motor being in 
motion, were whizzing, or 
something, and that the rear 
of that car swayed sideways 
(then you shall find that 
defendant) . • • was 
operating that car." 
(Parenthetical phrase mine.) 
In Commonwealth v. Clarke, 150 N.E. 829, the 
Massachusetts Court held that the defendant by 
manipulating the gears of a vehicle (with the engine 
off), which permitted it to move forward by its own 
weight and strike another vehicle, was guilty of operating 
a motor vehicle while intoxicated. This case is 
dissimilar in that the defendant's engine was not running, 
as was Appellant's engine in our case. However, the 
striking similarity is the natural effect of gravity. 
Whereas, the Massachusetts' defendant's car went three 
or four feet down hill at the command of gravity, our 
-11-
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Appellant's car mired itself in the mud with the help 
of gravity and spinning rear wheels. 
In contradiction of all of the above cases is 
a single 1929 Pennsylvania case where defendant tried 
to operate a vehicle with a broken drive shaft. 
Commonwealth v. Fox, 17 DC 491 (Penn. 1929). The court 
found that because the shaft was broken there was not 
the requisite control, but the Court noted: 
This is a very close case, 
and as the rule of law is 
that the benefit of the doubt 
should always be given to the 
defendant, we feel that ... 
it is doubtful if the defendant 
was the operator of the car 
within the meaning of the 
statute. 
But the court did order the defendant to pay 
the costs in the case. 
Although the issue of operating an immobile 
(or rocking) vehicle has not yet been decided in Utah, 
it is clear that where other states lexcept Pennsylvania) 
have confronted the issue, they have found the defendant 
to have been operating or in actual physical control 
of the vehicle even though the vehicle could not be moved. 
-12-
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Respondent also believes that it is important 
to remember that the uncontradicted testimony is that 
property damage did occur as the extrication attempt 
was being made; "It was digging up the lawn .•. quite 
badly." (T.25). And even though the rocking may not 
have produced perceptible movement forward or backwards, 
the car obviously went downwards. 
POINT III 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEFENSE OF IMPOSSIBILITY 
(OR IMMOBILITY) WOULD BE AN EFFRONT TO REASON, 
REHABILITATION AND JUSTICE. 
There is no reasonable doubt that Appellant was 
intoxicated; there is further no doubt that he was 
exerting his best efforts to move his vehicle. To 
absolve him from responsibility solely because his wheels 
were mired would be wrong. 
In the A.L.I. Model Penal Code, Tenative Draft 
No. 10 (1960), under Article 5, Inchoate Crimes, the 
A.L.I. noted: 
. • . conduct designed to cause 
or culminate in the commission 
of a crime obviously yields an 
indication that the actor is 
disposed towards such activity, 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not al0~2 er ~his ~~=asion, 
but c.1 others. There is a 
fk' ::l ,_,v:;re:"::n e, St7.bj ect 
Rgain to p"."npEr safeguards, 
ioL 3 legal basis upon which 
the s~eci~l ~~1g2r chat such 
jncl.; iFJ, a:Cs ,.r2se:it may be 
as~esss a~e tealt with. 
J.'1~2, .. 1-.: .:.t be made 0menable 
to the corrective process 
that the law provides . 
~inally, and quite 
ap2rt from these consider-
ations of prevention when 
t, ·2 ::.cC,Jri~ faiiure t8 
:o~~it the substantive 
oitPnse, as when cte bullet 
misses in atte-111_:ned ;;iucder 
CY- ,, hen tl1·2 e.c ~e'. :>..,::; -~ esp:mse 
of soiicitation is w~tnheld 
'.or w~Gn the ~rJnk d£1ver's 
wheels are stuck) , his ex-
culpation on that ground 
would. shock the common 
sense of justice. Such a 
cit12cio~ is unthinkable 
'x c -,~, mature system, 
···cc-,-::'' 0 n to se:--;e thc 
f~~~c~ seals of penal law. 
(~t n.2~, A.L.I. Model Penal 
Co~e, renative Draft No. 10; 
par~nthetical expression mine.) 
CONCLUSION 
The veTv ~dea that hppel~ant should escape the 
fair, j~st. and, hopefully educational consequences of 
his act, because his ~1r~c ·: -.-_ u :~ 1-~ ~~s been rejected 
in every forum, \'hc'c.e it \-ac: '-,E' -. ccr,sidered, ':;,ui~ one. 
If movement alone is the factor upon which this case is 
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to be decided (to the exclusion of all other operational 
~cts hy Appellant), the Court will find itself deciding 
how many inches or feet up, down, sidewards, forwards, 
or backwards constitutes "movement". A much more 
reasonable standard would proceed from the finding that 
defendant was intoxicated (or "under the influence") 
and that he did everything he could physically do with 
his vehicle to move it, and that his failure to move 
i:J10 v·eh•)_c·"Le, except deeper into the earth, did 
constitute "actual physical control". The City and 
Di.sti~ j_ct Courts' decisions should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAI~~ 
Ogden City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
526 Municipal Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
CERTIFICATE OF' MAILING 
I ~ertify that I mailed two copies of the 
iorv~,:iJug brief to George B. Handy, Attorney for 
D·~h1•.ddnt-Appellant, postage pre-· paid, 2650 Washington 
a 4401, this /a"-1-L Ogden, Utah day 
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